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The objective of this paper is to discuss the bilateral cooperation 
agreement on competition policy between Brazil and the United States, 
emphasizing possible lessons for similar arrangements among other countries. 
Many countries have enacted competition laws in the last decade. 
Enforcement of the new legislation poses difficulties in several jurisdictions 
due to lack of experience and of adequate material and human resources. At 
the same time, globalization brings to the fore new competition issues such as 
global mergers and anticompetitive practices which affect various countries.  
Table 1 illustrates the importance of global mergers for a developing 
country like Brazil. A sample of transactions appreciated by CADE, the 
Brazilian competition tribunal, indicates that 39% of the cases can be 
considered global, involving transactions that have an impact on relevant 
markets in more than two jurisdictions. 
 
Figure 1: Sample of mergers analyzed by CADE in 2000 











      
 
Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, 30% of the sample involved 
“denationalization”, defined as acquisition by a foreign group of more than 
50% of the capital of a Brazilian firm. This suggests the potential for  
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nationalist responses that could interfere with the implementation of 
competition policy. Needless to say, national governments may be tempted to 
introduce industrial policy considerations in several forms. 
 












International cooperation is crucial for coping with these new 
challenges. Bilateral cooperation is only one of the various forms of 
cooperation. Plurilateral and multilateral arrangements also play an essential 
role and are not in contradiction with bilateral initiatives. International 
organizations and NGOs are also very important. 
International cooperation is particularly important in three areas: 
(i)  strengthening institutions and disseminating competition culture; 
(ii)  reducing transaction costs for transnational mergers;  
(iii)  combating international cartels and other anticompetitive practices. 
The importance of international cooperation in the dissemination of 
competition culture cannot be overemphasized. International cooperation can 
compensate for the weakness of national constituencies supporting 
competition and attenuate the tendency for each national jurisdiction to 
underinvest in competition policy.   
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2. Bilateral Cooperation Agreement Between the U.S. and Brazil 
This section briefly describes the scope and objectives of the 
cooperation agreement between Brazil and the U.S. on competition policy. 
Brazil and the U.S. entered into a bilateral agreement on competition 
designed to effect: 
(i)  mutual cooperation in the enforcement of antitrust laws; 
(ii)  technical cooperation; 
(iii)  reciprocal consideration of each Party’s objectives in enforcing 
national antitrust laws. 
The following subsections outline the Agreement’s basic objectives.  
 
2.1 Mutual Cooperation in the Enforcement of Antitrust Laws   
The Agreement establishes that each Party shall notify the other as 
promptly as possible about investigations and cases that:  
(a)  are relevant to the activities of the other party in the enforcement 
of its laws; 
(b)  involve anticompetitive practices, other than mergers and 
acquisitions, carried out in whole or in substantial part in the 
territory of the other Party; 
(c)  involve mergers or acquisitions in which one or more of the parties 
to the transaction, or a company controlling one or more of such 
parties, is a company incorporated or organized under the laws of 
the other Party or of one of its states;  
(d)  involve anticompetitive practices believed to have been required, 
encouraged or approved by the other Party; 
(e)  involve remedies that expressly require or prohibit a practice in the 
territory of the other Party or are otherwise applied to the territory 
of the other Party;  
(f)  involve the seeking of information located in the territory of the 
other Party. 
In addition, the Agreement reflects the common objective of the Parties 
to cooperate in detecting anticompetitive practices as well as sharing  
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information that will facilitate the effective application of each others’ 
competition laws and enforcement policies. 
 
2.2 Technical Cooperation 
In accordance with the Agreement, the Parties undertake to work 
together in technical cooperation activities related to competition law 
enforcement and policy. These activities will include exchanges of 
information and competition agency personnel, participation of such personnel 
in courses, conferences and workshops organized by each other’s agencies, 
and such other forms of cooperation as are deemed appropriate by the Parties. 
 
2.3 Positive Comity 
The Agreement introduces positive comity principles into the relations 
between the Parties, meaning that they are committed to considering each 
other’s objectives in the application of their competition laws. 
More specifically, positive comity is reflected in the provision of the 
Agreement under which, if a Party believes that anticompetitive practices 
carried out in the territory of the other Party adversely affect its interests, the 
first Party may, after prior consultation with the other Party, request that the 
other Party’s competition authorities initiate appropriate enforcement 
activities. 
The Agreement recommends that the request must be as specific as 
possible about the nature of the anticompetitive practices and their effects on 
the requesting Party’s interests, and must include an offer of further additional 
information and cooperation. 
The requested Party’s competition authorities must carefully consider 
the request to investigate and promptly inform the requesting Party of their 
decision. However, the Agreement does not limit the requested Party’s 
discretion to decide whether to investigate the anticompetitive practices 
identified in the request. 
 
3. Considerations on the U.S.-Brazil Agreement 
It is important to note the limitations of the U.S.-Brazil agreement. First, 
it is not yet a formal agreement because it has to be ratified by the Brazilian 
House of Representatives and Senate.  
However, although the Cooperation Agreement is not in force, it has 
already been useful in building closer ties between Brazil and the U.S. in the 
field of competition. Informal exchanges of information and technical  
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cooperation have already taken place in a specific investigation (the vitamin 
cartel) as well as a merger affecting Brazil and the U.S. (Metal Leve). 
In addition, the U.S. has provided Brazil with informal assistance, 
especially in the form of knowledge developed in similar cases in the U.S., for 
the analysis of various forms of anticompetitive practice, such as exclusivity 
deals in the cigarette and credit card industries.  
Second, no confidential information may be exchanged. Even when the 
Agreement is in force this would appear to be a potential problem, particularly 
in light of the fact that most of the information obtained by the U.S. 
competition authorities is protected by confidentiality rules and the 
Cooperation Agreement does not oblige the Parties to provide confidential 
information.  
Third, although positive comity is a promising step toward international 
cooperation, the authorities are not obliged to take action. Common action on 
the part of different national authorities may require a long period of 
confidence building and agreement on other policies.  
In this regard it is worth noting the interest of the U.S. trade authorities 
in obtaining information from the Brazilian competition authorities on a recent 
cartel case in the Brazilian steel industry. The two governments might well 
have starkly differing views on steel antidumping policies. 
International cooperation depends on the stage of institutional 
development in each country, and Brazil is not yet a mature jurisdiction.  
In the initial stage, the emphasis should be on technical assistance.   
After some experience has been gained, it will be possible to promote simple 
agreements, known as First-Generation Agreements, which call for 
cooperation on specific antitrust cases and exchanges of non-confidential 
information.  
In a third stage, the two countries will be ready to engage in Second-
Generation Agreements, which involve systematic cooperation including the 
ongoing exchange of confidential information.  
The cooperation agreement celebrated by the United States and Brazil 
seems to be a good example of a first-generation agreement involving, as 
already mentioned, systematic cooperation by both countries’ competition 
authorities and exchanges of public information. 
As a first-generation agreement, the U.S.-Brazil agreement can be 
considered a positive model for countries that already have some historical 
experience with the implementation of competition policy.  
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